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FOREWORD: TWENTY YEARS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
David P. Leonard*
The Federal Rules of Evidence are now twenty years old.1 Their
adoption was a watershed event in the evolution of evidence law. For
decades after the codification movement for rules of civil procedure
began, evidence rules remained a creature of the common law. The
wisdom of codification was debated at the highest reaches of legal
academia, splitting Wigmore, its most prominent common-law voice,
from the ranks of those favoring a move to solidify the rules through
legislation.' Only when both the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Rules pro-
posed codifications3 did the movement begin to gather steam; and
even then, progress toward a code was neither- swift nor steady.4 But
in 1975 the movement came together in the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules or Rules).
This event threw the codification movement into high gear. Prior
to 1975 only a few states had codified their evidence rules; today, only
a handful have not.5 Moreover, virtually all of the codifications are
based on the Federal Rules,6 and though many states' versions differ
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. See Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence in Federal Court
Proceedings, 1 PUB. PAPEIs 6 (Jan. 3, 1975).
2. John H. Wigmore, chief consultant to the American Law Institute's project to de-
velop a Model Code of Evidence, ultimately dissented from the Code. See MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE xii-xvi (1942) (noting Wigmore's participation in project and ultimate dis-
sent); John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1942, at 23.
3. The American Law Institute's effort resulted in the Model Rules of Evidence in
1942, and the Commissioners' codification became the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953.
4. For an excellent review of the history of the codification movement that eventually
led to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACIICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE §§ 5001-5007 (1977).
5. For a review of the current status of state codification, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH &
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN BAR ASSN., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL
RULES IN THE STATES (1987 & Supp. 1994); JAcK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, STATE ADAPTATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE T1-T184 (1994).
6. The Federal Rules even influenced the drafters of the Uniform Rules, who, in 1974,
adopted a revised set of rules identical in structure and very similar in content to the Fed-
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in some respects from the Federal Rules, the similarities far outweigh
the differences. The time has not yet come when a lawyer from one
state can try a case in any other state without suffering any rude sur-
prises. But, the drafters' goal of achieving uniformity, at least in the
language of the evidence rules, is far closer to realization than one
might have imagined it would be at this time.
The Federal Rules are at once both conservative and innovative.
On the one hand, they retain the lion's share of common-law rules;
changes in specific rules from their common-law counterparts are
mostly incremental rather than revolutionary.7 On the other hand,
the Rules explicitly embrace certain values that may ultimately change
the structure of evidence law and the face of the trial. Judges are ex-
plicitly instructed to construe the rules "to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion
of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 8 They
are required to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to... make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
the truth, . . . avoid needless consumption of time, and ... protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."9 Judges are
also to lean in favor of admissibility rather than exclusion by admitting
any relevant evidence that does not offend other rules.10 And they
are given the tools with which to exclude evidence when they find that
questions of prejudice and other dangers loom unacceptably large."
But there are significant tensions in the Rules. Some of the draft-
ers' goals are in conflict. For example, the dual goals of promoting
uniformity' 2 and enhancing trial court discretion' 3 can work at cross-
purposes. If uniformity is the overriding goal, rules should be drafted
categorically; but uniformity can be the enemy of individualized jus-
tice. How should the courts apply rules that work at cross-purposes?
In addition, some rules contain significant internal tensions, giving
eral Rules. See UNIF. R. Evin., 13A U.L.A. (1994). Additional revisions in 1986 did not
alter the structure of the Uniform Rules. See i.
7. For example, opinion evidence of character is now admissible to the same degree as
reputation evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 405(a), 608(a). One could hardly call such a
change revolutionary.
8. FED. R. Evm. 102.
9. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
10. FED. R. Evm. 402.
11. FED. R. Evm. 403.
12. The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. Rnv. 40, 300 (1989).
13. Id.
[Vol. 28:1251
FOREWORD
trial courts perhaps far more breathing room than the drafters had
intended.1
4
The very leanness of the Rules has created profound interpreta-
tion problems. For example, what is to be made of the drafters' fail-
ure to mention a widely used common-law doctrine? The Rules, for
instance, say nothing about the use of evidence of bias or interest to
impeach the credibility of a witness. Does this omission mean the
drafters intended to abrogate the common-law rule allowing such im-
peachment?' 5 While the failure to mention bias impeachment was not
particularly troubling because the solution was relatively obvious, the
drafters' complete omission of any reference to the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" standard,' 6 which had governed the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence in the federal courts for half a century, became the
center of enormous controversy until its-at least tentative-resolu-
tion in 1993.17 The fact remains that large areas of the law of evi-
dence, all of which have rich common-law backgrounds, are simply
not covered by the terms of the Federal Rules; and in the twenty years
since codification, the explicit scope of the Rules has not been
broadened.
After twenty years of litigation, and little formal amendment, it is
now appropriate to look back at our experience with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. There are several categories of questions we can
ask. First, to what extent has the broad "discretion" that the Rules
grant to trial judges proven effective in serving the Rules' stated goals,
as well as other goals and values that codification should serve? In
particular, have we achieved a measurable degree of uniformity and
predictability? Has this heightened power granted to trial judges led
to any desirable or unfortunate changes in the way lawyers construct
their presentation of evidence?
Second, what effect has the grant of broad powers to the trial
court had on the appellate function in evidence cases? Are all ques-
tions of evidence law to be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion"
14. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b), 901.
15. The Supreme Court, of course, held that bias impeachment was retained by the
rules even though the drafters provided rules governing other impeachment methods and
failed to include impeachment by bias. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1984).
16. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R.
Evro. 702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993). The
Supreme Court decided that the drafters intended to abrogate the Frye standard in favor
of what it considered to be a more lenient relevancy-based standard more in line with the
general structure of the Federal Rules.
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standard, as some courts would assert?18 Or is a more searching in-
quiry sometimes justified? Has the appellate role-to the extent it
was ever meaningful in the context of evidentiary rulings-been re-
duced to a largely meaningless task? If so, is this necessarily a bad
development?
Third, when matters of interpretation arise, by what standards
should the courts measure the meaning of the Rules? Should the Fed-
eral Rules be viewed as if they were a normal statute enacted through
the usual legislative process? Or is a different approach to interpreta-
tion justified? The brevity of the Rules makes this a particularly im-
portant question, as does the fact that many states have adopted the
Rules in whole or part with little or no recorded legislative history to
which the courts can turn.
Fourth, has the fact that many states have adopted large portions
of the Federal Rules led to a degree of uniformity in practice, and not
merely in language? Have the state courts followed the federal
courts' interpretations of the Federal Rules? Has the states' adoption
of the Federal Rules slowed or terminated state evidence law develop-
ment? If so, is this a good or bad thing?
18. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 40 F.3d 239,246 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Our standard of
review for determining whether the district court committed reversible error in either the
admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion."); Holmes v. Elgin, Joliet & E.
Ry., 18 F.3d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We review the trial court's admission of evidence
under the abuse of discretion standard, inquiring not whether we would have ruled the
same way but rather whether any reasonable person would have agreed with the trial
court."); Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We
will uphold the district court's evidentiary rulings over objections properly made at trial
unless the court abused its discretion... and caused 'manifest injustice to the parties.' ")
(citation omitted) (quoting Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 663 (10th Cir.
1991)); United States v. Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d 1532, 1534 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We review
the trial court's admission of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.").
Decisions of the sort just quoted are legion. It is far more unusual to find courts
recognizing that some evidentiary rules do not grant discretion to the trial court and, there-
fore, should not be reviewed using the "abuse of discretion" standard. One such unusual
decision is Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993), where the court wrote:
Usually when an appellant seeks a new trial by reason of a district court's alleged
error on a ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we review the ruling on an
abuse of discretion basis. But here our review is plenary as the district court's
ruling on the admissibility of Mrs. Lippay's hearsay evidence implicates "'the
application of a legally set standard.'"
Ld. at 1496 (citation omitted) (quoting Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir.
1989) (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Litig., 723 F.2d 238,257 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986))).
The Author has explored the question of the proper standards for appellate review of
evidentiary decisions in David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1188-93 (1992).
[Vol. 28:1251
Finally, as we look to the future, and especially as the newly ap-
pointed Evidence Advisory Committee undertakes its review of the
Rules, what specific rules, or areas of evidence law, are in need of
reform? And despite the particular reforms that appear wise, what
types of reforms are we actually likely to see?
At the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, held in New Orleans, three distinguished legal academics ad-
dressed some of these questions in the Evidence Section's Program.
Professor Faust Rossi of Cornell Law School was "present at the crea-
tion," and warned at a fairly early date of the dangers of too much
trial court discretion.19 Professor Paul Rothstein of Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center advised Congress on the drafting of the Federal
Rules and has been an active observer of the courts' application of the
Rules.20 Professor Eileen Scallen of the University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law, has considered the question of how the Fed-
eral Rules should be interpreted.2'
The Essays that follow are based on the papers presented at the
Conference. Professor Rothstein's Essay, Intellectual Coherence in an
Evidence Code,' begins with the the premise that an intellectually
coherent code should not "contain contradictory and inconsistent
mandates that do not make theoretical sense."23 Unfortunately, in
many respects the Federal Rules of Evidence do not meet this stan-
dard. The result, he writes, is to grant the courts unlimited discretion
because they can choose to apply a rule by focusing on one of its con-
tradictory bases or the other. 4
Professor Rothstein uses two illustrations. The first is Rule
404(b), which governs evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts."
This rule purports to forbid propensity evidence, but at the same time
admits evidence that depends on propensity inferences for its rele-
vancy. Professor Rothstein offers some thoughts on how the rule can
be made coherent, and, in the process, rejects the "doctrine of
chances" approach recently advocated in the literature.2- He suggests
19. See Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, LrNG., Winter 1983, at 13.
20. Professor Rothstein's early article, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, FED. B.J., Winter 1974, at 21, remains a very useful examination of the general
themes and biases of the Federal Rules.
21. Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning and the Law of Evidence,
44 AM. U. L. REv. (forthcoming May 1995).
22. 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1259 (1995).
23. Id.
24. 1d
25. Id. at 1260-65.
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that we distinguish among different kinds of propensities, excluding
evidence that requires reasoning through character-based propensity,
but not other propensity evidence.z6
Professor Rothstein's second illustration is Rule 901, which gov-
erns authentication and identification.27 There is an incongruence, he
writes, between the two parts of the rule, the first of which appears to
be a simple requirement of minimal relevancy, and the second of
which requires more.28 Judges, therefore, can do anything they want
with these conflicting mandates, "[a]nd they do."
29
Unfortunately, Professor Rothstein writes, these intellectual in-
coherencies have not worked themselves out in the cases.3
Professor Rossi's Essay, The Federal Rules of Evidence-Past,
Present, and Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective,31 focuses on three
"major transformations" caused by the Federal Rules.32 First, he
notes the "striking success" of the national codification movement.3
The Federal Rules, he writes, "have created order out of the disarray
that once ruled the landscape. They have given us a reasonably uni-
form national law of evidence applicable in both state and federal
courts. This evolution, and its beneficial by-products, represents a
stunning achievement. ' 34 Professor Rossi states that the Rules have
enhanced clarity and accessibility, but, by taking a very conservative
approach to existing doctrine, the drafters missed the opportunity for
more substantial reform. 5 In addition, he writes, the failure to codify
rules in some areas has sacrificed uniformity and clarity, as has the
drafters' decision to eschew detailed rules in favor of general rules
which left many questions unanswered.3 6 Professor Rossi also criti-
ques the Supreme Court's "plain meaning" jurisprudence, which has
led to overturning established common-law rules that the drafters
probably intended to leave intact. The Court's approach, he writes,
26. l at 1264-65.
27. d. at 1265.
28. d. at 1265-70.
29. Id. at 1270.
30. Id.
31. 28 Loy. L.A. L. RFv. 1271 (1995).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. IM.
35. Id. at 1272.
36. Id. at 1272-73.
37. Id. at 127475.
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"greatly magnifies the consequences of drafting errors and the need
for rule amendments.1
3 8
Second, Professor Rossi notes the greatly enhanced admissibility
of expert testimony, despite recent signs of retrenchment.3 9 Ex-
panded admissibility in this area was the drafters' intent, and it has
been accomplished.4" The result, he writes, is a presumption in favor
of expert testimony.41 This, in turn, reflects greater confidence in a
jury's ability to see through the charlatan, and assumes the adversary
system's effectiveness.42
Finally, the residual exceptions have begun a revolution of sorts
in the hearsay area. The courts have used these exceptions aggres-
sively and often, a development Congress did not intend.43 Indeed,
courts have "mocked" the Senate Judiciary Committee's admonition
that the residual exceptions were to be used very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances.44 Professor Rossi focuses on several par-
ticularly troubling uses of the residual exceptions.45
Looking to the future, Professor Rossi sees much greater rule-
making activity, some of which can draw on the large buildup of schol-
arship on the Federal Rules, which provides a "ready -agenda for
change. "46
Professor Scallen's Essay, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes,47 is a
specialized application of the principles of interpretation about which
she has written and on which her Conference paper focused. In par-
ticular, she critiques Justice Scalia's public choice theory of statutory
interpretation, which holds that it is wrong to rely on committee re-
ports or other legislative history because this allows Congress to abdi-
cate its law-making responsibilities.48 Even if this is a proper position
with respect to some legislation, Professor Scallen writes, it does not
apply to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence because under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress and the
38. Id. at 1275.
39. d. at 1277.
40. Id..
41. Id. at 1278.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1279.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1279-81.
46. Id at 1281.
47. 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1283 (1995).
48. Id. at 1286.
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judiciary share the power to make rules of procedure, including evi-
dence rules.49 Thus, the Advisory Committee has a "special role.., in
the legislative process," making its Notes significant.50 She writes that
the Advisory Committee Notes are a legitimate source of legislative
history concerning the Federal Rules.5 1 In fact, because the Advisory
Committee is comprised of judges, practitioners, and legal academics;
because it is appointed by the Chief Justice; and because it has close
contact with the realities of law practice, it "acts as buffer between the
highly politicized interests of the general bar and the judiciary respon-
sible for promulgating the rules." 2 For various constituencies to be-
lieve that their voices have been heard, "the compromises-or
'deals'-described in the Notes must be given some real weight.
5 3
Professor Scallen then reviews the use and abuse of the Advisory
Committee Notes in Tome v. United States,54 in which the Court inter-
preted the prior consistent statement hearsay exemption to retain a
common-law requirement that is not mentioned in the rule.55
Finally, Professor Scallen explains why the "practical reasoning"
approach is the most appropriate way to engage in the interpretive
task.56 Professor Scallen concludes that the Supreme Court's "most
'solid' constructions manifest the qualities of candor and complete-
ness, qualities essential to the persuasiveness and the educative func-
tion of the Court. '57 Vital to this process is consideration of the
drafters' thoughts embodied in the Advisory Committee Notes as well
as in the more traditional congressional materials.58 To say, as Justice
Scalia does, that the Notes are not binding "is to beg the question of
what value they have." 59
Though the Essays presented here begin to address some of the
important questions we must ask as the Federal Rules of Evidence
mature, they represent only a beginning. Twenty years is enough time
to begin a serious evaluation. But it is the responsibility of the courts,
the Congress, and academia to make the evaluation process a continu-
ing one. Anything less would sanctify momentum over principle.
49. Id. at 1287.
50. Id. at 1288.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1292.
53. Id. at 1293.
54. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
55. Scallen, supra note 47, at 1293-1301.
56. Id. at 1301.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1302.
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